This study examines the price performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Cyprus Stock Exchange during the period 1999-2002. It investigates the difference between the IPOs listing price and their equilibrium market price through studying a sample of 75 new listed companies. Specifically, it examines the differences between the listing price of IPOs and their equilibrium market prices at the end of the first day, sixth, twelfth, twenty-fourth and thirty-sixth month. From the derived results it is evident that Cypriot IPOs have extremely large positive initial returns, especially on the end of the first trading day. Long term results, not taking into account the first day returns, are much lower and sometime even negative. Both these trends are in agreement with the outcomes of international empirical studies.
Introduction
The 29 th of March 1996 is a symbolic date for the Cyprus economy. The Cyprus Stock
Exchange started its operations as a legal entity in the form of a public corporation body.
Since then many firms decided to go public in order to raise capital from institutional and private investors and expand their activities.
Taking a firm public is a significant turning point in the life of a firm with serious wealth implications for the existing shareholders. The success of the public listing depends among other factors, on the ability to determine an offering price that represents fairly the intrinsic value of the firm. To avoid certain uncertainties involved in the public sale of their securities, firms retain underwriters who undertake the risk of pricing and selling new securities. Underwriter's main role is to make sure that the issue will be fully absorbed by the public with the highest possible price.
The international evidence on the initial public offerings has focused on the study of two anomalies. Firstly, new issues are offered to the investors in prices much lower than the after aftermarket stabilization. Despite the use of underwriters the issue price do not represent the expected by market price and new shareholders make profits in the back of the old. Secondly, the long-term performance of IPOs seems to be poor and the returns to the initial investors proves to be negative.
Using as fuel the strong international evidence for initial underpricing and the negative long-term returns there will be an effort by the present study to search the price behavior of new issues and explore if that phenomenon finds application also in the case of Cypriot IPOs.
Some of interesting features of this market are the followings. First, Cypriot is the smallest market the international evidence has ever searched. With a population of less than one million and more than 250 listed firms this market combines unique characteristics. Second, the time lag between issue day and first day of trading is high enough to delay entrance in the stock exchange up to three weeks from the time of sale to the investors. The last increases the uncertainty of the investors and may affect pricing of IPOs and flotation costs. Third, opposite to the IPOs in the U.S. which are priced very close to the offering date, Cypriot newly listed firms are priced few weeks before causing higher pricing and waiting risk.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In section 2 the reasons for underpricing are clearly stated and the international literature is described. Section 3 examines the legislative framework for Cyprus Stock Exchange. Section 4 presents, the methodology, regression model specifications, determinants of the model and sample characteristics. The initial and aftermarket performance of the sample is examined in section 5. The paper concludes with a brief summary in section 6.
Literature Review

Reasons for underpricing
A number of reasons have been raised for the new issues underpricing phenomenon and long-term performance with different theories focusing on various aspects of the relation between investors, issuers and underwriters taking the firms public. The main theories are reviewed and presented in the following lines. Rock (1986) introduced a model, which provides the explanation for the information asymmetry between the investors. It was named as 'winners curse hypothesis' and symbolizes the win that informed investors achieve as they are rewarded the most underpriced IPOs. Uninformed investors are the losers, as they do not know which issues will be underpriced and so they are allocated large fraction of overpriced shares. Beatty and Ritter (1986) , Barry and Jennings (1993) support this hypothesis by providing evidence from U.S. market. Tinic (1988) states that firms underprice IPOs to decrease the probability of lawsuit by investors. Indication of a legal liability can create negative impression for an IPO and can cause the failure of the issue. Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) 
examined 93
IPOs that were involved in lawsuits and find that they were not affected at all by any negative publicity. Thus they reject lawsuit avoidance hypothesis arguing that litigation risks arise after the initial offering. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , Welch (1989) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) consider underpricing of IPOs as a tool used by firms to signal their quality. Signaling theory mainly targets in seasoned offerings as the more a firm underprice its listing price, signaling its high value, the more likely it is that it will reissue. Investors through underpricing become aware of the true value of firm so the market expects 'less money on the table' in the future subscriptions. Su and Fleisher (1997) , and Hammed and Lim (1998) support signaling theory for Chinese and Singapore IPO markets. On the other hand Garfinkel (1993) and Espenlaub and Tonks (1998) suggests that underpricing has little signaling effect on the seasoned offerings. Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) and Ritter (1991) based on the long term underperformance of the market report that excess initial returns are caused by overvaluation of IPOs by investors and the presence of fads in the early aftermarket. The fads hypothesis supports that IPOs are priced well and it is the investors' enthusiasm that overvalues the IPOs. add Levis (1993) provide international evidence which support the fads hypothesis. On the other hand Allen et al (1993) and Huang (1999) states that it is not possible to support the fads hypothesis.
Welch (1992) presents a model in which potential investors pay attention not only to their information but also in the behaviour of the other investors. If an individual has favorable information about an IPO and sees that no one else wants to buy he may change his opinion and decide not to go ahead with a bid. This is the point that underwriter in an agreement with the issuer decide to underprice the IPO and induce a cascade in which all potential investors want to buy. Booth and Chua (1996) and Brennan and Franks (1997) support the ownership dispersion hypothesis. They argue that firms are willing to underprice in order to have a diffuse ownership base and create a liquid market for their shares. Underpriced IPOs generate excess demand and create a large number of small shareholders. This is crucial for all IPOs as they aim for high participation of public in order to make difficult for outsiders to challenge management.
International evidence on the short and long run performance of IPOs
There are many studies in empirical literature on IPOs concentrated mainly on the issues of short-term underpricing and long-term underperformance. Table 1 gives a summary of the most recent findings in a number of countries around the world. In some cases due to a numerous number of studies for the same market we had to use the accumulated results reported in Loughran et al (2006) updated version.
Researchers have extensively examined the U.S. IPO market over the last decades. The last update by Loughran et al (2006) Opposite to the short-term overperformance, evidence on long-term in the U.S. suggests underperformance. Loughran and Ritter (1995) find the three-year holding period return on a sample of 4,735 IPOs to be -20%. The aftermarket underperformance in the United
States is confirmed by Ritter and Welch (2002) who indicated in their study that the long term returns were negative for an investor buying new titles in the offer price period.
A look in other world leading markets i.e. Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK shows similar trend. Crossing the border to the States we meet Canada. Summary by Loughran et al (2006) in 540 Canadian IPOs indicates low initial returns of only 7%.
Despite the low level of underpricing, Kooli & Suret (2002) show in their study that long term return to Canadian investors are negative at 16.86%. France, experiences slightly higher initial returns at 11.6% but Loughran et al (2006) summarizing existent studies
show that the long term underperformance is only 4.8%. The last figure highlights that the France market is reliable for the long term oriented investors as they will not loose the invested money during the offer price period. Ljungqvist (1997) and Rocholl (2004) CSE establishes basic (minimum) requirements for obtaining a listing. However each company that seeks a listing must satisfy some basic requirements, the most important of which are the following. The expected market value of the proposed issue must be in excess of 2 million Cypriot Lira, the issuer must have published audited accounts for at least the three years preceding the application, companies that have been established with the sole purpose of financing a large project and it is not allowed for any shareholder to control either directly or indirectly. Finally more than seventy per cent of the share capital and a percentage of at least twenty five per cent of the share capital must be satisfactorily dispersed to the public at large.
A company who wishes to enlist its stock in the Main Market must abide to all laws governing the 'general enlistment of new stock' in the Cyprus Stock Exchange. It must also abide to the following special requirements: At least 25% of the shares which will be issued must be held by the general public and by 1000 legal or non-legal entities, which none have a share amount which exceeds 2% of the share total. No shareholder must control directly or indirectly an amount exceeding 70%.
Methodology, sources and data
Measures of initial, short and long-term performance
Using the term initial we calculate the returns of the IPOs in the end of first day of trading. Short-term performance includes the returns in the end of second day of trading while long-term performance covers a period up to three years. We measure the level of underpricing of IPOs listed on the CSE boards using the conventional method, where the raw initial return (RIR) on the first day of trading is calculated as follows:
where P i,1 is the price at the end of the first day of trading and P i,0 is the offering price.
The initial return is adjusted for market changes, taking into account movements of the Cyprus Stock Exchange General Index (CSEGI) between the closing date and the first day of trading. Raw initial return, which is calculated by the above equation, does not have a time lag between the closing day and the first day of trading in the stock exchange. During this period, many changes in market conditions may occur. As a result the initial return measured may be a result of changes in market conditions. So the raw initial return is adjusted for market changes and variances.
The market adjusted initial return is calculated as follows:
where MI i,1 is the General index price at the end of the IPO first day of trading and MI i,0 is general index price at the last day of IPO public offering period.
The long-term return is computed by measuring the returns of each offering for months 6 and years 1 through 3. The market adjusted returns for each offering i is measured as the return from the offering price in a first set of results and from first trading day's closing price in a second set to the calendar day, where t is 6 months and 1, 2 or 3 years minus the equivalent market returns over the same period.
The excess return for company i in month t is defined as:
Where r it is the raw return for company i in month t and r bt is the benchmark return in month t. It follows the calculation of the average benchmark adjusted return on a portfolio of N stock for month t.
The cumulative adjusted returns are then calculated as the summation of the average abnormal returns. This is based on the arguments proposed by Barber and Lyon (1997) .
The evaluation of the long-run performance will be held in the aid of this measure. 
Regression model specification
The following regression equations are used to assess the determinants of shortterm outperformance and long-term underperformance of IPOs Return i =α 0 +α 1 TLAG i +α 2 SIZE i +α 3 AGE i +α 4 UND i +α 5 HC i +α 6 OWN i +εi (3) TLAG i is the period between the announcement of the offer price and the first day of trading. Loughran et al (1994 , Updated 2003 suggest that the longer the time period between setting the offer price and listing, the greater will be the underpricing level, conditional on the offer not being withdrawn. Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) report that the time between the IPO announcement day (that is, the day of prospectus) and the first day of market trading affects the underpricing level. Su and Fleisher (1998) Lakonishok et al., (1994) ; Loughran and Ritter, (1995) ). Literature documents that if smaller firms tend, on average, to be more risky, then first day returns are expected to be bearish related to firm size. In general, larger firms have a higher association with a larger flow of external information sources than smaller firms. The difference between those amounts of the information revealed when a data item is disclosed and the market's expectation is inversely related to firm size. AGE i is the operating history of a firm prior to going public. Ritter (1984) , Clarkson and Merkley (1994) , Nazir and Zin (1998) , and Kaneko and Pettway (2003) support that firms are expected to have lower ex-ante uncertainty compared to younger firms because older firms have more public information available than younger firms.
Companies that are older and have a longer operating history have more information available to the public. Younger firms, especially companies with a lower operating history provide lower information to the public. Those five underwriters have listed more than 70% of the total market capitalization and number of listed firms in CSE. Beatty and Ritter (1986) , Beatty and Welch (1996) and Carter et al (1998) report that a prestigious underwriter can help the issuer to get a higher price for its shares, which is to accept a smaller IPO discount than normal. Thus, the reputable underwriter's goal is to set the issue price to maximize profits earned from the IPO. Nanda and Yun (1997) and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) specify that underwriters should be very careful because their reputation could be easily harmed if an IPO is over priced and yields negative first day and long term returns.
HC i, is a dummy variable equal to 1 for hot periods and 0 if it is a cold. Hot issue periods are those months with an average initial return greater than the half, whilst cold period issues are identified as those with an average initial return of less than the half.
Hot markets are characterized by great uncertainty and issues have to be discounted even more than usual to attract uninformed investors. Cold markets occur when there is comparative less uncertainty and therefore less discounting. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) , Ibbotson et al (1986) , Affleck-Graves (1996) , Lowry and Schwert (2002) Benveniste et al (2003) , Derrien and Womack (2003) , and Kaneko and Pettway (2003) measure the relationship of returns with the market movements to determine the impact of "hot' and "cold" markets upon the level of underpricing and stocks underperformance. They suggest that companies should choose the cold issue market to go public so that they can gain from higher prices of hot periods. OWN i , measure the percentage of shares retained by pre IPO shareholders. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) report that we can see the best information about a company's future prospects by the fraction of shares given by owners after the IPO. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) , Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) extend the above study and find an inverse relationship between the proportion of shares given by owners and the initial average returns. Hingorani et al (1997) in a study for the Czech firms suggest that low given holdings by insiders can signal that the firm possesses valuable assets. According to them, "insiders by virtue of their international advantage are more likely to own shares of companies when they expect the firm to generate high returns".
Sample
The data collected cover the period of January 1999 During the preparation of the database for the new listing in the CYS there were some constraints with specific IPOs with a result to exclude them from our sample.
Specifically four IPOs that went public in year 1999 were eliminated from the sample due to lack of information. Moving to next year four IPOs that were listed during 2000 were excluded later from trading with a result of losing closing prices for specific future points creating difficulties in the calculation of long-term returns. Six IPOs of the same year were listed by offer for sale -through the placement of securities that have already been public -without issuing new shares, or allocated and four IPOs we re listed by private placement -an offer has been made to specific investors for the sale of shares. There are thirteen firms, which do not present detailed financial statement for the year before being an IPO because they were established only few months before going public.
There are three IPOs of year 2001 that were listed through the placement of securities that have already been public and one that offered shares for free in existing It is clearly visible that the 'buy and sell' strategy in the short term seems to be much better from the 'buy and hold' strategy in the long term. This finding can be a motivation for shareholders to flip their shares and get the profit than hold them and start losing in the long term. Panel B of Table 3 reports the short and longer-term returns excluding the first day returns and shows that from the first six months, the return achieved on the first trading day has already eroded. In particular, the mean adjusted returns on the six month period is -0.13% and then constantly decreases to -3.68% after 12 months, -7.42% after twenty-four months and -15.36% after thirty-six months. Triaina Investments Public Co, had a 425.42% six-month raw return and a 104% six month adjusted return, a result clearly contracting the general negative trend.
Empirical findings
Initial underpricing and long-term performance
The previous results provide a general idea for the extent of short and long-term returns. Those results require carefully study, as during the examined period they were in effect special Stock Exchange financial circumstances. Specifically, the study of General Index shows a significant increase from the middle of 1999 to half of 2000. This is internationally known as the 'bubble' effect and it forces on a more analytical study in annual base. On the other hand the positive returns tend to decrease, similar to all the other cases.
The above shows immediately perceptible that during 1999-2000 when CSE experience intense conditions, the returns the investors experienced were impressively high, especially for individuals and institutions that got offers before going public.
Carrying into the firms of the 2001-2002 periods they offered only negative returns in the long-term period. Additionally buying in the end of the first day of trading proves to be a very bad idea.
In In table 6 firms are segmented on the basis of their age at the time of going public, computed as the year of the offer minus the year of founding. IPOs are classified in four categories the 'baby' IPOs, 'childhood', 'teenage' and 'mature' IPOs. 'Baby' IPOs have the lowest initial returns mainly due to luck of information which de-motivates investors to take even the risk and invest. Consistent with the notions that risky issues require higher average initial returns Cypriot case indicates that 'childhood' IPOs (4-9 years in operation) offer abnormal returns. The level of initial returns remains high for the 'teenage' firms and tends to decrease in the less risky 'mature' IPOs. Our results are related with Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) who document a negative relation between initial returns and age and confirm that age is a proxy for risk.
The aftermarket performance patterns using age as a measure of ex-ante uncertainty can be seen in table 6. It appears that on a three-year long-run basis 'childhood' and 'teenage' IPOs provide the worst returns and proves to be a bad option of investment. Alternatively the 'mature' firms give better aftermarket returns without getting out of the norm of the negative returns. We consider the poor long-term performance of the younger IPOs, which have as in the US case higher market to book ratios than more established firms as an evidence of the overoptimism. The firm characteristics of the Cypriot stock offerings used in this study are presented in Table 8 . The mean period between the date of prospectus and first day of trading is 29 days with the maximum being more than 3 ½ months. The average market capitalization for Cypriot IPOs is 31.2m Cyprus Lira (68.57m USD) and the mean size of the stock offerings is 1.83m Cyprus Lira (4.0m USD). Retained ownership, defined as the proportion of shares retained by the pre IPO owners, is high at 87.16%. (1) TLAG, Time lag between IPO announcement (the date of prospectus and first day of trading) (2) Size, use a control variable to describe if a firm is large or not, (3) AGE, Ln (1+Age) the natural log of the total of one plus the age of the company in years on the listing date (4) UR, Underwriters reputation which gets the value '1' for reputable underwriters and '0' for non reputable, (5) The correlation matrix in Table 9 suggests that no multi-collinearity problem exists among the independent variables in this study. 
Regression analysis for the determinants of initial underpricing
Two cross sectional least square regressions of initial excess returns are estimated and summarized in Table 10 . The first uses the raw initial returns and the second adopts the general market index searching for adjusted level of underpricing. All standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The results show that there is significant relationship between the magnitude of initial underpricing and TLAG indicating that the period between the announcement of the offer price and the first day of trading makes difference on the returns offered to investors. This is consistent with the findings of Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) and Su and Fleisher (1998) that the time between the IPO announcement day and the first day of stock trading affects the level of underpricing.
The size of the offering, SIZE, is significant as a determinant of underpricing indicating that the smaller the IPO, the greater the initial return. Similar to Keloharju (1993) we support the rationale that asymmetric information is less and therefore underpricing should be less for bigger firms. In Cyprus, larger IPOs attract a large number of subscribers, and each subscription is of a larger size. Investors are interested in submitting larger orders in larger IPOs, because such IPOs have a more liquid aftermarket, which mitigates the liquidity cost of selling their holding.
The coefficient for AGE is also statistically significant. The negative sign is consistent with the international evidence revealing that history prior going public is a substantial determinant for high initial returns. Our result is consistent with the evidence of Ritter (1984) and Kaneko & Pettway (2003) , indicating that firms with long operating history are associated with lower market adjusted initial return.
The finding regarding underwriter's reputation, UND, is negative, as almost every relative study has been underlined. Further to the predicted sign there is no significance of UND with the level of underpricing, an element which indicates that reputable underwriters are not powerful enough in the Cypriot market. We find that 'hot market'
IPOs experience significantly high initial returns. This evidence is consistent with Ibbotson et al (1986) who report that hot issues markets perform average initial returns that sometimes reach unbelievable levels and are associated with increasing volume. This result is consistent with "hot issues theory" observed by Ritter (1984 ), Hensler et. al. (2000 and Derrien and Womack (2003) .
The coefficient on retained ownership is negative and insignificant indicating that it makes no difference whether the issuer firms will offer higher proportion of their equity to the market or not. The high-retained percentage of shares by pre-IPO shareholders shows that Cypriots are not ready to loose control of their firms. This opposes to Brennan and Franks (1997) finding that on average a large majority of British shares owned by pre -IPO shareholders are sold at the IPO period. (1993) and Levis (1993) .
The retained ownership of the initial stockholders-owners of the firms was not found significantly related to initial day returns but it is proved a significant factor for the annual IPO underperformance. This finding adds to the literature and mainly to the finding by Leland and Pyle (1977) that firms with greater insider selling should have worse long run performance. It matches with Jain and Kini (1994) that the long-run underperformance can be partly explained by the worsening managerial incentives following the IPO.
Conclusion
This paper studies the underpricing and the long-term performance of 75 IPOs issued in Cyprus between January 1999 and December 2002. Consistent with results from previous studies, and much higher than the initial returns reported by Ritter (1991) for US IPOs and many other researchers for international IPOs, we find that there is a huge underpricing of Cypriot IPOs, as the average return of new issues at the entrance day to the stock market calculated to be 100.4%. The last figure becomes even higher if we count four outliers that have been excluded from the sample. IPOs are priced substantially below their actual price because of the high level of uncertainty (confusion among the investors), which exists in the market. Investors take advantage and they make very good initial returns once they buy shares in the issue price period.
The long-term performance that includes the first day returns, remains significantly positive for Cypriot IPOs once the focus is up to one year period, but it turns negative for a holding period above the two years. If the first day of trading is excluded then the aftermarket behaviour of Cypriot IPOs becomes negative from the sixth month after listing. A strategy of investing one Cyprus Lira in IPOs at the end of the first day of public trading and holding the shares for a three-year period would have left the investors with only 33 pences. This suggests that it is not a good strategy to hold IPOs for long period.
The results from multivariate regression analysis highlight several significant findings. First, the IPO underpricing is positively related to the number of days between offering period and listing, suggesting that public investors require a larger underpricing if they have to wait longer to trade the new issues. Second, underpricing is negatively related to the size of IPO. To the extent that the market capitalization is an indicator of the length of a firm, our results suggest that the companies with larger market capitalization will have lower level of underpricing. Third, we also find negative relationship between underpricing and the age of IPOs by the time they go public. Ex ante uncertainty is associated with the history of the firms and it seems to make the difference, as relative young firms, named as 'childhood' and 'teenage' IPOs, are highly associated with high initial returns. 'Mature' IPOs bring less uncertainty and assist the market to price them near their actual value. Finally, underpricing is positively related to the prevailing market conditions by the time IPOs goes public, suggesting that the large underpricing is due to 'hot issue' markets. This is consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2002) who find the performance of the market to be significantly related to the magnitude of underpricing in the U.S.
We also examine the variables, which affect the long-term performance of IPOs.
Multivariate analysis based on a 1 to 3 year period, reveals significance of three factors.
Initially the IPO aftermarket underperformance is negatively related to the size of the firms, suggesting that large IPOs should expect less negative future returns. Similar to the short-term, market condition plays an important role in the aftermarket. The IPOs with excess initial returns tends to offer extremely negative in the long term.
The question that is raised is how to interpret the significantly long-run underperformance that follows the IPOs. One interpretation might be that large information asymmetry causes the market to be irrationally optimistic about the initial public offerings. This fact leads investors to pay too much in the immediate aftermarket period for an IPO and then discover the mistake in the following years as argued by Ritter (1991) , who concludes that the offering price of underperformed IPO stocks is not too low but too high. Although our results are consistent with this fact, this simple irrationality during IPOs offering does not seem to explain the whole phenomenon.
Despite the fact that the findings of the existing study is in line with the international literature, it is almost essential any further study on Cypriot IPOs. The period of this study presents some unique characteristics, as the stock market boom does not represent the actual increase in the value of shares. The 'bubble effect', which was followed, had as a result excess returns to be taken by the investors. The stock market after the phase of its euphoria experienced a strong downward period. Its main characteristics were the high uncertainty among the investors, the lower level of daily trading in the stock market and the negative aftermarket returns.
